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Abstract 
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Brazilian Agriculture: Policy Objectives in Conflict 
Introduction 
Like many other de~eloping countries, the Government of Brazil faces 
what app~ars to be conflicting objectives and polici~s toward the agri-
cultural sector of the country. Agricultural price policy in Brazil 
and other developing countries is often based on a compromise between 
forces that argue for domestic self-sufficiency and hence high prices and 
those that argue for low prices to stimulate industrial processing of raw 
materials, and to provide low cost food for urban, industrial workers. 
Other agricultural policy objectives may include increased food produc-
tion, an adequate and stable supply of quality food products, stable and 
remunerative farm prices for basic products, and competitive prices so 
that agriculture can generate foreign exchange on exports and save 
foreign exchange by avoiding food imports. 
Of all these objectives, three can be considered as fundamental to 
Brazilian agriculture: 1) increase food production for the internal 
market so as to moderate inflationary pressures on food prices, 2) expand 
sugarcane production to permit a partial substitution of domestically 
produced alcohol for the consumption of imported petroleum, and 3) stimu-
late the production of export crops to earn more foreign exchange. It ~s 
quite apparent that these three objectives could easily be in conflict 
and that to accomplish all three would require an outstanding performance 
from Brazilian agriculture. 
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The challenge is enormous when one considers that the domestic 
population is growing at a rate of about 2.5 percent annually, that the 
inflation rate exceeds 200 percent annually (in recent years), that 
Brazil requires huge amounts of foreign exchange to finance its imports 
and to service its large foreign debt, and that Brazil has a large fleet 
of automobiles that are usLng increasing amounts of alcohol for fuel 
rather than imported petroleum. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the performance of 
Brazilian agriculture during the last ten years in relation to the 
objectives that the Government has placed before it. Section II of this 
paper will briefly examine the principal policies implemented to accom-
plish Lhe objectives and Section III will examine the performance in 
terms of real prices (nominal prices adjusted for inflation), production 
of the basic food and export products, and imports and exports of agri-
cultural products. The last section contains the conclusions of the paper. 
Policy Instruments 
The Brazilian government employs a wide number of policy instruments 
La alter the allocation of resources to achieve the desired objectives. 
The import substitution industrialization policies followed since the end 
of WW II have been the most significant of these policy instruments. 
These policies included a chronically over-valued exchange rate, export 
taxes, quotas and prohibitions, price controls on basic foodstuffs and 
high tariff and non-tariff protection of domestic industry. Through 
these policies the government was able to transfer large amounts of 
resources from agriculture to lhe rest of the economy. Although the 
Brazilian government has liberalized some of these policies, (e.g. export 
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controls and more flexible exchange rate policies) since 1964, economic 
conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s led to a return to the earlier 
policies that adversely affect production incentives to farmers. 
The primary policy instruments that the Government has used to 
compensate agriculture for the discriminatory policies described above 
have been credit at low and even negative real rates of interest and 
expansion and improvement of the m1n1mum price guarantee program. The 
price guarantee program covers the basic crops of rice, beans, manioc, 
corn, soybeans, and sorghum plus other products for a total of about 42 
commodities. Costs of production, expected world market prices and 
domestic consumption needs are the most important criteria used 1n 
setting the minimum price. The minimum prices are to be announced in 
advance of the planting season 1n order to assist producers in their 
planting decisions. The minimum price guarantee has a loan option that 
permits the producer to hold the commodity off the market (either on farm 
or 1n a government approved warehouse) until prices increase or sell to 
the government at the minimum price if prices do not improve. 
Because of the high rates of inflation in Brazil, the minimum prices 
often lagged the rate of inflation during much of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s resulting 1n low real minimum price guarantees to farmers. 
Actual government procurement has generally been less than 10 percent of 
production for the basic grains; however, the loan and storage option has 
been used quite extensively because of the low interest rates charged on 
the storage loans. Cotton, rice and soybeans have been the main crops 
benefitting from the loan and storage option. With the exception of 
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rice, the domestic food crops have benefitted little from the price 
support program. For this reason, the price support program has not been 
an effective stimulus for tncreased food crop production. 
Abundant credtt and very low real rates of interest to promote 
increased production have been a major policy instrument of the govern-
ment throughout the 1970s and ~arly 1980s. Total credit flow as a 
percent of the net value of agricultural output increased rapidly during 
the 1970s. During the late 1970s nominal interest rates ranged from 
about 13 percent to 20 percent annually on short term agricultural credit 
when the general price inflation was increasing from 40 percent to nearly 
80 percent annually leading to a large negative real rate of interest. By 
1980 some nominal interest rates were as high as 36 p~rcent but inflation 
had increased to nearly 100 percent so that the agricultural credit 
subsidy was getting even larger [Levy]. 
The major export crops (soybeans, coffee, sugarcane, cotton and 
cocoa) receive a credit share roughly similar to their share of the gross 
value of crop output. On the other hand manioc and black beans (domestic 
food crops) receive a credit share of only 4 percent but account for 16 
percent of the gross value of crop output. Wheat and rice receive a 
credit share that is double their share of the value of crop output. 
Thus, the lion's share of the credit subsidy goes to the export crops and 
a couple domestic food crops. 
Brazil has maintained retail and/or wholesale price controls on a 
wide variety of domestic food crops since the mid-1960s in an effort to 
control inflation. Export crops have generally been free from these 
price controls. Some livestock products such as beef and milk have also 
been subject to price controls. In addition, the Government of Brazil 
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has para-statal marketing organizations (Brazilian Food Company, COBAL) 
that directly market food products in an attempt to control and regulate 
food prices. Wheat production and marketing is also highly controlled 
and heavily subsidized by the Government. An imp0rtant impact of the 
price controls, that set prices in nominal terms, can be a decline in 
real prices and a loss of production incentives t0 farmers. ThLs can 
occur rapidly in an inflationary economy when the nominal control price 
is only adjusted periodically with a lag. 
Agricultural Performance 
Most developing countries which are also oil importers faced a large 
increase in import expenditures after the oil price increase of 1974. 
During the period 1973-1975, Brazilian oil imports increased from 769 
million dollars to 3.1 billion dollars. To offset this rapid increase in 
oil import costs, Brazil designed a policy to increase its agricultural 
exports and at the same time substitute ethanol (made from sugarcane) for 
gasoline for its domestic car fleet. These policies put a tremendous 
pressure on the agricultural sector through increased demand for such 
products. 
The production of crops for the export market was encouraged through 
several agricultural policies. Frequent de-valuations of the exchange 
rate in the late 1970s and early 1980s created strong price incentives to 
produce for the export market. The government reduced the sales tax from 
15 percent to 5 percent for that portion of the crop sold to foreign 
markets. The government also invested Large amounts of capital in port 
facilities and transportation facilities to lower the costs and speed the 
movement of crops from production areas to export ports [Feldens]. 
Incentives were also offered to the farm sector in the form of subsidized 
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production credit, and credit for buying machinery, equipment and 
fertilizer. The benefits of the subsidized credit went to those who buy 
such goods; mainly larger farmers who could economically use farm 
machinery [Araujo and Meyer]. 
The effort to increase revenues from the export market concentrated 
on selected agricultural products (soybeans, coffee, cocoa, oranges, 
tobacco and sugarcane) which the country was already exporting. Most of 
the export crops are related to large farm operators while the production 
for the domestic market is supplied by small farm operators. 
For analytical purposes, a classification of products into the 
domestic market and export market was made according to the major market 
destination of the product, and the market that exercises the greatest 
influence on prices. A comparison of the average growth rate of produc-
tion of these products for the domestic market and export market is shown 
1n Table l. An important result of the incentives to increase revenues 
in the export market from the agricultural sector is reflected in the 
high average growth rates of production of most products that were 
exported. The export market products of oranges, soybeans, sugarcane, 
cocoa, tobacco and coffee had an average annual growth rate during the 
period 1973-1981 much higher than the products that were produced for the 
domestic market. Two of the domestic market crops (manioc and black 
bPans) had declining average annual growth rates in this same period.The 
high growth rate of chicken production is partially due to the small 
amount that was produced in the ~arly 1970s and that 25 percent of its 
production is for the export market. 
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A high annual growth rate of production can be expected to continue 
in th~ n~ar future for the export crops because many of these products 
are almost permanent plants. The farmer's decision in cultivating these 
crops depends heavily on future expected profits. Increased productiv-
ity and economic returns will occur only four years or more after the 
planting is done. These crops have a higher ratio of fixed to variable 
costs 1n the first years compared to annual cultivated crops. Thus, even 
with a r~duction in real prices, farmers may not reduce in the short run 
the amount of area dedicated to these products. 
The soybean land area competes strongly with corn and black beans. 
The 1973-74 world price increases in soybeans and the abundant subsidized 
credit and other policies encouraged the farmers to invest more in this 
specialty crop for the export market. The high risk of productivity 
swings in black beans, caused by climate changes or diseases, is a major 
reason for the production stagnation despite the real price increases. At 
the same time, black bean production is a typical small scale farm crop 
which did not receive the advantage of the credit policy. 
Another important measure in evaluating the performance of the 
agricultural sector is to calculate the per capita production over time. 
These results are shown in Table 2 for the basic domestic food products 
for the period 1978-1983. The production per capita for the different 
products has rather large fluctuations in some years which may result in 
large fluctuations in prices and consumption patterns. Production per 
capita for four of the six food crops has declined steadily in this 
period. The availability of these products on a regular basis is accom-
plished through increased imports. Timely imports of agricultural 
products will reduce the impact of higher prices for the consumers but 
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at the same time may also reduce the income to farmers Ln years of lower 
production and consequently do not stimulate increased domestic pro-
duction. 
The change in real prices 1s a mixture of trends (Table 1). While 
the prices of the export crops depend more on the international markets 
(except maybe for coffee), the prices of the domestic crops were regu-
lated closely by the government price control policy. The change in real 
prices among crops is very important in the farmer's decision because of 
the Low opportunity cost of farmland. A decrease of 6 percent annually 
in the real price for soybeans did not affect the growth of Brazilian 
production. The expansion of new areas in the central-west of Brazil 
with low cost Land, contributed to the increased soybean production. 
Incentives 1n credit for production and construction of new alcohol dis-
tilleries, and the increase in pr1ces for gasoline resulted in real price 
Lncreases of over 4 percent annually for sugarcane (the highest of any 
crop). 
The government control prices on domestic food crops increased the 
risk of lower prices and income when compared to the export crops. The 
lower growth rate of production or even reduction in production forced 
the government to import some agricultural products. The price subsidy 
on wheat for the consumer (which is a good substitute for several other 
food products in the Brazilian lower income diet) increased even more 
rapidly the demand and therefore imports of this product. In order to 
maintain an adequate supply of food for a growing demand, Brazil went to 
the international market to buy basic food products that already are 
produced and could be supplied by domestic production. 
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The policies implemented during 1974-76 increased the dep~ndence on 
agricultural imports in the latter 1970~. In 1975, the share of agricul-
tural imports as a percent of all imports (except oil) was around 7.8 
p~rcent while during the period 1980-83, the share of agricultural 
imports increased to 18.5 percent (Table 3). The major agricultural 
import products were wheat, rice, corn, beef, black beans and milk. These 
six products represented over 70.0 percent of all the agricultural 
imports in 1983. The amount spent on these imports more than doubled in 
the period 1975-1983. During this period the inflation rate increased 
from 39 percent a year to 117 percent which affected most adversely the 
lower income people. One indication of the effects of this high infla-
tion is the impact on the government controlled minimum wage rate which 
decreased from an index of 100 in 1977 to 66 in 1984; reducing incomes 
and consequently the demand for food (Table 4). 
Conclusions 
The performance of the Brazilian agricultural sector accomplished 
only part of the three basic objectives through the policies implemented 
after 1974. During the period 1973-1981, the annual growth rate of 
output of export crops (oranges, soybeans, sugarcane, cocoa, tobacco and 
coffee) was 5.55 percent or more. The output increase in sugarcane was 
enough to supply the domestic substitution of ethanol for gasolin~ and 
earn some additional export revenues in sugar. 
The domestic food production sector did not have a similar perform-
ance. In order to provide enough food for the domestic market, the 
expenditures on agricultural import products during the period 1975-1983 
increased from 420.1 million dollars to 1.02 billion dollars. The major 
food imports were wheat, rice, corn, beef, milk and black beans. Almost 
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all of these products can be produced at volumes adequate to supply the 
domestic market. Wheat is the one exception. But, with the reduction in 
consumers subsidies on wheat prices, other good substitutes could be used 
such as corn, manioc, barley and other cereals. These can be produced in 
the country. 
In the long run, a declining production of products for domestic 
consumption, increasing amounts of agricultural products for exports and 
increasing amounts of food imports will be in conflict. The future rate 
of inflation will have some of 1ls roots in the short supply of agricul-
tural food products on the domestic market. Price policy for domestic 
food crops needs to be re-directed in order to stimulate increased 
domestic food production, particularly in these crops where Brazil is an 
efficient producer. 
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Table 1: Annual Growth Rate of Production and Real Prices of Selected 
Products f0r Domestic and Export Markets, Brazil, 1973-1981 
DOMESTIC MARKET EXPORT MARKET 
PRODUCT 
GROWTH RATE 
OF 
PRODUCTION 
GROWTH RATE 
OF REAL 
PRICES!!/ PRODUCT 
GROWTH RATE 
OF 
PRODUCTION 
GROWTH RATE 
OF REAL 
PRICES!!/ 
Corn 
Banana 
Rice 
Wheat 
Black Beans 
Manioc 
Cattle 
Hogs 
Chicken 
3.45 
3.26 
2.17 
l. 33 
- 0. 16 
- 0.55 
3. 17 
3.14 
19.42 
Percent 
- 3.42 
0.58 
- 3.32 
- 1.47 
4.22 
1.68 
1.32 
- 2.18 
- 4.54 
Percent 
Oranges 9.80 
Soybeans 9.44 
Sugarcane 7.45 
Cocoa 6.67 
Tobacco 5.95 
Coffee 5.55 
Peanuts - 3.64 
a/ Nominal prices deflated by index number two of the Fundacao Getulio 
Vargas. 
Source: Calculated by the authors. 
Table 2: Per Capita Production of Selected Food Products for Domestic 
Consumption in Brazil, 1978-83 
PRODUCT 
Rice 
Potatoes 
Black Beans 
Manioc 
Corn 
Wheat 
1978 
64.4 
17.8 
19.4 
224.7 
119.8 
23.7 
1979 
- - - -
65.4 
18.5 
18.8 
214.8 
140.3 
25.2 
Source: Fundacao Getulio Vargas 
1980 1981 1982 
- - Kg/Capita -
82.1 67.4 77.6 
16.3 15.7 17.2 
16.5 L9.2 23.2 
197.0 200.9 191.9 
171.0 173.0 174.7 
22.7 18.1 14.8 
- 2.19 
- 6.09 
4.27 
0.95 
- 1.56 
0.59 
- l. 95 
1983 
60.4 
14.2 
12.4 
169.5 
146.1 
17.7 
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Table 3: Value of Imports of Major Agricultural Products, Brazil, 
Selected Years 
PRODUCT 
Rice 
Beef 
Black Bt>ans 
Milk 
Corn 
Wheat 
ToLal of Six Products 
Six products as a percent of 
ToLal AgriculLural Imports 
Agricultural imports as a percent 
of all imports except oil 
1970 
1.5 
14.3 
0.3 
127.2 
143.3 
Source: CACEX and calculated by the authors. 
y E A R s 
1975 1980 
Mill ions of Dollars 
23.9 103.8 
18.6 98.3 
2. l 30.7 
14.2 81.8 
1.3 269.1 
360.0 1051.9 
420.1 1635.6 
52.6% 70.1% 
7.8% 15.7% 
Table 4: Monthly Minimum Real Wage Rate for Brazil, Period 1970-84 
1983 
ll3. 5 
44.9 
1.9 
19.0 
37.2 
804.8 
1021.8 
74.0% 
18.5% 
Year 
Wage Rate 
Cruzeiros of 
1977 
Index 
1977 = 100 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
916.37 
933.09 
950.92 
954.87 
902.77 
935.66 
1,016.80 
1,027.20 
1,045.13 
986.97 
970.66 
943.36 
947.02 
778.80 
678.99 
Source: Calculated by the authors. 
89 
91 
92 
93 
88 
91 
99 
100 
102 
96 
94 
92 
92 
77 
66 
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